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Abstract.
The paper presents a closed economy model of endogenous growth driven by capital
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is calibrated to fit data for India, an approxmiately closed economy. Simulations
suggest that fiscal policy certainly matters and the choice of the income taxation
rate, the mix of government spending between infrastructure and public consumption
goods, and the long-run government debt/GDP ratio can all significantly affect the
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substantially.
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The view that a country’s growth rate is related to fiscal policy is by no
means new to the development literature. Two theoretical developments in
macroeconomics have provided a rigorous underpinning for this perception. The
first, of course, is the endogenous growth ’revolution’; the second lies in the
modelling of non-Ricardian effects of fiscal policy on private sector consumption
and savings.
The overlapping generations model of Yaari (1965), Blanchard (1985),
Frenkel and Razin (1987) and Weil (1989) show that even if households are
intertemporal optimisers over the indefinite future with rational expectations,
Ricardian equivalence fails if each household’s probability of survival to the next
period is below unity and/or there exists population growth. In the model presented
in this paper there are two further reasons for the breakdown of Ricardian
equivalence. First, all income, including income from wealth, is taxed which
introduces a distortion reducing savings. Second, we divide consumers into a very
low income group and the rest. The low income group own no wealth and consume
out of current disposable income. We refer to this group as ’liquidity constrained’.
The remaining consumers are unconstrained, own all the nation’s wealth and make
consumption and savings decisions derived from microfoundations.
It is useful to categorise the growth literature into four types of models.
1
First, there are the traditional Solow-type growth models which allow for growth
through technological change, but make it exogenous. Second, there are models
1 See Romer (1991), Buiter (1991) and Hamond and Rodriquez-Claire (1993)
for recent surveys of the theoretical literature.
1which support endogenous growth through the accumulation of human capital. (e.g.,
Lucas (1988), based on work originally carried out by Uzawa (1965)). Third, we
have models which abandon price-taking by firms and assume monopolistic
competition in which firms produce knowledge that is used in the production of a
distinctive new good (e.g. Romer (1990)). The approach we follow models external
effects of capital accumulation on labour productivity which, at the aggregate level,
gives a production function with at least constant returns to scale in capital
2. This
genre of model goes back to Arrow (1962). We generalise over recent version of
that approach by Romer (1986) and Barro (1990) models to allow for both private
capital and public infrastructure raise labour productivity. We also provide a
generalisation on the demand side of Barro who adopts a model with Barro-
Ricardian equivalence. The demand side of our model is closest to those in
Alogoskoufis and van der Ploeg (1991) and Saint-Paul (1992). They combine Yaari-
Blanchard consumers with a production function which is linear in private aggregate
capital, but do not consider tax distortions, government infrastructure effects and
liquidity constraints.
We confine ourselves to a closed economy; for open economies, the
mechanisms by which external debt affects domestic real interest rates and hence
growth are different from those arising from domestic debt, raising new issues
concerning risk premia etc. (See Rebello (1992) for a penetrating discussion of
endogenous growth models of open economies). India fits our closed economy
2 In fact the production function we use exhibits constant returns to scale in total
private plus public capital. Increasing returns to scale can be handled but prevent
analytical solutions. See Xie (1991) for a useful treatment of this issue.
2assumption well. In section 3 we calibrate the model set out in the preceding section
using macroeconomic data for India and we compute an order-of-magnitude feel for
the effects on long-run growth of government debt, liquidity constraints and the
division of government spending between consumption and infrastructure
expenditure. Section 4 considers the extent and nature of the time inconsistency
problem in the choice of debt and taxation paths to finance a given path for
government spending. Section 5 provides brief conclusions.
2. The Model
Our economy is closed and inhabited by consumers who are divided into two
groups: those who are liquidity-constrained, who consume current post-tax income
and the remaining unconstrained consumers who own all the financial and private
physical wealth. Unconstrained consumers choose consumption and savings to
maximise an intertemporal utility function, subject to a budget constraint. Firms are
competitive and maximise an intertemporal profit function. There exists an
exogenously growing population and individual labour supply. The efficiency of the
latter depends upon the economy-wide capital-labour ratio which generates the
endogenous growth. Goods and labour markets clear instantly.
3
Non-Ricardian effects of government debt are important in this paper and
occur for four reasons. Following Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1985), households
leave no anticipated bequests to their heirs. A second reason for a breakdown of
3 Alternatively labour markets may be subject to insider and/or efficiency wage
effects which prevent the labour market from clearing. Our model can then be
interpreted as one with unemployment permanently at its natural rate.
3debt neutrality is the existence of population growth (Weil, 1989). The Yaari-
Blanchard-Weil consumption function - set out below - combines those two features.
The government finances public expenditure on goods and services by distortionary
taxation (the third non-Ricardian effect) or borrowing. Finally, the existence of
liquidity constraints is a fourth reason for the breakdown of Ricardian equivalence.
Time is discrete
4. The details of the model are as follows (See table 1 for a
summary which includes the notation used).
Households
Our unconstrained consumers consist of overlapping generations, that are
identical apart from age. Each faces a constant probability p per period of death.
The single-period utility function of the consumer is logarithmic in private and
public consumption and life-cycle aspects of labour income are ignored, labour
income being the same for consumers of all ages.
Consider the unconstrained consumer born in period s. Her intertemporal
expected utility function at time t³s, in the absence of any uncertainty apart from
death, is given by
(2.1)
where q is the rate of time preference, and Ci,s and denote consumption of the
private and public good respectively over period [i,i+1]. Household labour supply
is assumed to be exogenously fixed. Real consumer financial wealth at the
4 Our use of discrete time differs from much of the literature in this area which
uses continuous time. This choice is not fundamental but the time consistent policy,
obtained by dynamic programming, turns out to be more transparent in discrete time.
(See Appendix B).
4beginning of period i is given by
(2.2)
where Di,s is (non-indexed) government debt held by domestic consumers and Ki,s
is capital stock owned by consumers. All stocks and flows are expressed in units of
domestic output. Suppose that a constant tax rate is levied on all income. Labour
supply is assumed to be growing at an exogenous rate so no distortions arise here.
Consumers now receive an expected real return on their assets where
is the average tax rate.
The consumers budget identity is given by
(2.3)
where is labour income net of tax and is a premium paid by insurance
companies who inherit each consumer’s non-human wealth on death. Solving (2.3)
forward in time and imposing the usual tranversality condition transforms the
identity into the following constraint
(2.4)
The consumer maximises (2.1) subject to the intertemporal budget constraint
(2.4). The problem is standard and leads to the solution
(2.5)
where µ is the consumers ’mortality adjusted’ rate of time preference defined by
. If p=0 then r=0, µ=q and we arrive at the familiar result for a
representative agent model of consumption in which links between present and
future generations are complete and consumers act as if they have infinite lives.
Combining (2.4) and (2.5) leads to
(2.6)
5where Ht,s is human capital defined by
(2.7)
This completes the optimisation problem for the cohort of unconstrained consumers
born in period s. We now turn to their aggregate behaviour.
Let be the size of the cohort born during period [s,s+1] who are still alive
at the beginning of period t. Then . Let b be the birth rate defined
by where Lt is the population size. If g denotes population growth, then
. Hence we must have that
(2.8)
Performing the summation leads to
(2.9)
which determines the birth rate b. Aggregate variables are defined as follows: For
flows such as the consumption of unconstrained consumers we have
(2.10)
whilst for stocks such as human capital
(2.11)
Taking first differences we have
(2.12)
The first term in on the right-hand-side of (2.12) is equal to since human
wealth of all age groups is equal (the ’perpetual youth’ assumption). From (2.7)
human capital accumulates according to
(2.13)
The premium r for a competitive insurance industry must satisfy the zero profit
condition . Hence (2.12) and (2.13) give
6(2.14)
where is the human capital of the unconstrained consumers. Aggregating
financial wealth similarly, the first term in the summation is because the
newly born consumers (born in period [t,t+1]) inherit no financial wealth which can
only start accumulating from t+1 onwards. Hence, corresponding to (2.14) we have
(2.15)
where . From (2.6), (2.14) and (2.15) we arrive at the discrete-time Yaari-
Blanchard consumption function
(2.16)
which describes the consumption and savings behaviour of the unconstrained
consumers.
The constrained consumers consume current post-tax (and possibly post-
transfers) income and accumulate no wealth. Their consumption is therefore given
by where is their pre-tax labour income. Total pre-tax labour
income is given by . Suppose that constrained consumers receive
a portion l of post-tax (and benefit) labour income. Then we must have that
which with (2.16) determines total consumption
.
Private Sector Output and Investment.
The representative firm f produces homogeneous (value-added) output with
the following Cobb-Douglas constant returns to scale production function at time t
(2.17)
where Kft is private physical capital and Jft is labour input in efficiency units. Write
(2.18)
7where et,i is a measure of the efficiency of raw labour input Lt. The crucial
assumption that drives endogenous growth in this model is that this efficiency
measure is a function of the economy-wide capital-labour ratio (see Buiter (1991)
for an interesting discussion of this formulation). Let Kt be aggregate private capital.
In addition to the externality from private capital, the government affects labour
efficiency by providing physical capital in the form of infrastructure which may be
broadened to include education, health etc, accumulated out of the economy’s single
output. This is captured by
(2.19)
Note that for an exogenous growth model with Harrod-neutral productivity growth
at a rate x say, we would replace (2.19) by . Assuming identical
firms, and aggregating, we arrive at the aggregate production function
(2.20)
where and . Note that if , (2.20) reduces
to the Romer (1986) model with only private sector externalities and we have
.
Firm f ignores the externality in choosing capital stock. Equating the private
marginal post-tax product of capital to the post-tax cost of capital (including
depreciation at a rate d), and assuming that profits net of depreciation are taxed gives
(2.21)
This completes the behaviour of the private sector. We are now
turning to the public sector.
The Government.
8The government provides an amount of public consumption goods using
the same technology as for the privately produced good, and purchases an amount
of the latter to invest in infrastructure. Total government expenditure is then
which is financed by a combination of taxation (Tt) and borrowing (Dt).
(We ignore or rule out seigniorage). The government borrowing identity is given by
(2.22)
and public sector capital accumulates according to
(2.23)
assuming the same depreciation rate as in the private sector.
Output Equilibrium.
Equilibrium in the output market gives
(2.24)
where gross private investment is given by
(2.25)
The supply and demand sides of the economy are now completely determined given
the government choice of fiscal policy variables and . It is convenient
to express all macroeconomic stock and flow variables as ratios of GDP.
5 The
model is summarised in this form in table 1 below. Note that (2.21) assumes that
only profits net of depreciation are taxed at the rate tt. Total receipts are therefore
. Thus Tt which now denote total receipts as a proportion of output is
given by .
The Steady-State.
5 To ease the notational burden we retain the same symbols to denote these
ratios. Thus in (2.21) becomes etc.
9We seek a balanced growth steady-state in which all stocks and flows are
growing at the same endogenous rate N, the steady-state value of Nt. To facilitate
the subsequent analysis we choose the time interval constituting a period such that
rates N, R, p and q are much smaller than unity. The second order terms can then
be ignored. With this approximation the steady-state forms of the model summarised






10Yaari-Blanchard and Liquidity-Constrained Consumers:
(i)
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where =consumption of unconstrained and constrained consumers
respectively, Vt=private sector financial wealth, Kt, =private and public capital
stock, It, =private and public investment, =public consumption,
=total government expenditure, Dt=government debt, Tt=taxation, all as
ratios of GDP. Rt=the real interest rate. Nt=(Yt+1-Yt)/Yt=growth rate. tt=Tt/(1-
dKt)=tax rate. Important parameters are: p=probability per period of death,
b=(p+g)/(1-p)=birth rate where g is the population growth rate, µ=(p+q)/(1-
p)=mortality adjusted rate of time preference, d=depreciation rate. g2=socially
efficient private sector share of capital stock and is the
corresponding share in a market equilibrium. and are measures of the
external effects of private and public capital on labour efficiency respectively.
11Table 1. Summary of Model.
3. Fiscal Policy and Long-Run Growth.
This section studies the steady-state of the economy given by (2.26) to (2.30).
Given fiscal instruments, t,G
Cand G
I we have five equations in five endogenous
variables R,C,D,K and, of course, growth N. Since we wish to focus on the effects
of government debt D, the distortionary tax rate t and the mix of government
spending as between consumption and investment, we will characterise fiscal policy
in terms of D and t making total government spending endogenous. Let G
I=gG
making the third fiscal instrument the proportion g.
Derivation of Multipliers.
Consider the Yaari-Blanchard consumption relationship (2.26) and the
production function (2.29). Eliminating C, K and G using the remaining equations
leads to the following two relationships determining R and N given D,t and g.
(3.1)
(3.2)
The relationship f(N,R,D,t)=0 describes the locus of interest and growth rates
consistent with Yaari-Blanchard consumption behaviour, output equilibrium, private
sector investment and the government budget constraint. We term this locus the
Yaari-Blanchard (YB) curve. In a Ricardian world associated in this model with
p=g=0, it becomes the ’golden rule’ ; the real post-tax growth-adjusted
real interest rate equals the private sector’s rate of time preference and this
12relationship in unaffected by changes in government debt. In our non-Ricardian
economy with p+g>0 this is no longer the case. The relationship g(N,R,D,t,g)=0 is
the locus consistent with balanced growth and our linear technology, private sector
investment and the government budget constraint. We call the relationship the linear
technology (LT) curve. For the Romer (1986) model and the LT curve is
vertical; for an exogenous growth model the LT curve is horizontal.
Consider incremental changes in the exogenous fiscal variables dD, dt,d gand
the corresponding incremental changes dN and dR along the YB and LT curves.
Differentiating, these incremental changes satisfy
; (3.3)
Hence keeping fiscal policy fixed, the slopes of the YB and LT curves are given by
; (3.4)
From (3.1) we have
(3.5)
Here (because C>0 and V>0). Let . Then from
(3.1)
(3.6)
and it follows from (3.4), (3.5) and (3.6) that the YB curve is upward-sloping.
Turning to the LT curve, from (3.2) we have
; (3.7)
Hence gN<0 if . For G=0.3 and N+d<0.1, this condition is satisfied if
D<3 (i.e., a debt/GDP ratio less than 300%), which is not a stringent condition.
Then a sufficient (by no means necessary) condition for gN<0 is that
Here the numeratore is a 4th order whilst the denomiator is of the second order
13therefore we can reasonable assume that this condition is satisfied. For example, if
the parameters appearing in the condition as .5, .1, .8, .1 and .15 respectively, we
would need that G>.18, which is a reasonable requirement.
From these considerations and (3.4) we deduce that, under very lax conditions, the
LT curve is downward-sloping.
The remaining partial derivatives are
; (3.8)
; ; (3.9)
From these results we can unambiguously sign gD<0 and gg>0. We require
for to obtain positive consumption which gives ft<0 and gt>0. Finally
along f=0 we have that . Hence fD<0 if which requires
extraordinarily large capital/GDP and debt/GDP ratios to violate. To summarise we
expect:
(3.10)
Consider next the effect of changes in fiscal variables on the YB and LT
curves. From (3.3) keeping R and t fixed, . Hence the YB curve
shifts to the right as a result of an increase in the debt/GDP ratio D. Similarly
keeping R, t and g fixed, . Hence the LT curve must shift
downwards if D rises. The combined effect is that an increase in D reduces growth
but has an ambiguous effect on the real interest rate. These results are illustrated in
figure 1 below.
6
We can confirm this result by solving (3.3) to obtain dN and dR as functions
6 Note that in an exogenous growth model, the LT curve is horizontal and the
effect of increasing D is to unambiguously raise the real interest rate.





where . Hence we arrive at the proposition
Proposition 1
Steady-state growth can be increased by reducing the debt/GDP ratio D, and/or
increasing the proportion g of government expenditure devoted to public
investment.
The Optimal Growth Rate
All this accords with economic intuition. The sign of however is
ambiguous. The reason for this is that as the tax rate increases, given the debt/GDP
ratio, a higher government spending-GDP ratio consistent with the government
budget constraint can be reached. Part of this additional spending goes on
infrastructure which enhances growth. However taxes are distortionary and, for a
given real interest rate R, an increase in the tax rate reduces savings as a proportion
of GDP which depresses growth. An optimal growth rate is achieved at the tax rate
15where which from (3.12) is given by . Substituting in for the
derivatives leads to a complicated relationship which provides no useful insights.
However an intuitively plausible analytical result can be obtained for the case
studied by Barro(1990) which is (Barro-)Ricardian (p=g=h=0) with no depreciation
(d=0), and a balanced budget (D=0). Then, from (2.26) and (2.27), f=R(1-t)-q-N=0
and G=t. Substituting into the condition leads to the proposition:
Proposition 2.
In a Ricardian economy with no depreciation and a balanced budget, the
optimal rate
of growth is achieved at the tax rate .
16Calibration and Numerical Results for India.
The calibration strategy is as follows: ’deep’ parameter values q and a are
chosen by calibrating the steady-state values of selected variables of the model;
namely, the return on capital and the consumption/output, government spending
ratios, to observed data. Thus we construct a microfoundations model, in which
consumers maximise utility and producers maximise profits, which is consistent with
observed data.
7.
Rates of return for projects financed by the World Bank average around 15%.
This we identify with the marginal product of capital which has to be divided
between the two components of the cost of capital, the real interest rate, R and the
depreciation rate, d. For physical capital and advanced industrial countries a rough
division would be R=5% and d=10% on an annual basis, the latter reflecting
depreciation through technological obsolescence as well as wear and tear. Our
concept of capital in this paper is broader and incorporates human as well as
physical capital. We expect a rather lower depreciation rate for human capital and
reflecting this we choose the division R=10% and d=5%. There are a number of
studies which estimate Yaari-Blanchard consumption functions with liquidity
constraints. Haque and Montiel (1989) obtain an estimates of 0.344 for the
proportion of liquidity constrained consumers in India and rather higher estimates
for some other LDC’s.
This does not exactly correspond to our parameter l but, nonetheless, we put l=0.3.
7 This procedure corresponds to the approach of Shoven and Whalley (1992).
A more sophisticated approach uses stochastic simulations to compare observed
historical moments with population moments from the simulation model (see,
Gregory and Smith (1991)).
17IMF figures for India give consumption and total government spending on
goods, services and investment at 64% and 22% of GDP respectively, leaving 14%
of GDP for private investment (assuming an approximately closed economy). From
(2.30) this implies
a private capital/output ratio of 1.87. This is on the high side for physical capital,
especially for a LDC (see, Obstfeld (1994)); but since we are including human
capital in this measure, this figure seems reasonable enough.
Growth rates of GDP (per capita) and population over 1980-91 for India were
2.5 and 2% respectively. Life-expectancy of a new-born child is reported by the
World Bank as 61 years. However new-born children do not immediately start
making consumption and savings decision. We also need to correct for the fact that
the model imposes a constant probability of death. For people that make decisions
in the middle of their lives, a constant probobility would underestimate the risk of
death. To correct for both the timeing of savings decisions and non exponential
length of life, we believe that an average probability of death per year p=1/40 is an
accurate representation of reality. The IMF figure for the government debt/GDP in
1990 is 53%. To sustain G=22%, the budget constraint (2.27) implies that the
taxation rate must rise to t=29% in a sustainable steady-state. Finally World Bank
figures for 1990 gives government investment as a proportion of spending at 30%
and we therefore choose . We divide the externality effect of private and
public capital equally choosing g1=0.5. From these calibrations and using (2.26)
(2.28) and (2.29) the ’deep’ parameters a, A and q are revealed as a=0.28, B=0.7
and q=0.06. Details of our chosen calibration are summarised in table 2.
18With this calibration the multipliers (3.11) to (3.13) have the following values
at the sub-optimal tax rate t=0.29.
(3.14)
Thus our calibrated model says that 50% decrease in the government debt/GDP ratio
from its present 53% will increase the per capita growth rate of India by almost
0.5% raising it to around 3%. Raising the proportion of infrastructure spending from
g=30% to 40% will raise growth by 0.8%. The present rate of taxation t and total
government spending G is below that which will generate the highest growth rate
with g=30%.
Now let t and G increase for a given D and g, consistent with the steady-state
budget constraint. Figures 2 to 5 show how growth rates increase to their maxima
for different values of D (figure 2), g (figure 3), (figure 4) and l (figure 5). The
effects of changing D and g reported above for the sub-optimal taxation rate still
approximately hold at the optimal rate which is around t=0.4. This is close to t=1-
g2=0.36 as predicted by proposition 2 for the Ricardian case. The effect on growth
of changing the liquidity parameter l is rather small. Making the poor even poorer,
because the ’rich save’, will not increase the long-run growth rate of the Indian
economy significantly.
19Parameter Value Source
Marg. Prod. Capital=R+d 0.15 World Bank
Depreciation Rate=d 0.05 Imposed
Real Rate of Interest, R 0.10 Imposed
Consumption/GDP=C 0.64 IMF
Gov. Exp./GDP=G 0.22 IMF
Gov. Debt/GDP=D 0.53 IMF
p=1/life-expectancy 1/40 World Bank
l=liquidity parameter 0.3 Haque and Montiel (1989)
GDP growth (per capita) 0.025 IMF
Population growth 0.02 IMF
20Gov. Investment/G=g 0.30 IMF
Capital Externality=g1 0.5 Imposed
0.64
Capital/GDP=K 1.87 Equation (2.30)
a 0.28 Equation (2.28)
q 0.06 Equation (2.26)
A=B
(1-a) 0.70 Equation (2.29)
Table 2. Summary of Calibration. Sources: Data for India from The World
21Bank (1992), IMF (1992).
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4. Intertemporal Aspects of Fiscal Policy: Is There a Time-Inconsistency
Problem?
Until now the paper has focused on the steady-state of an economy in which
consumers are intertemporal optimisers. Fiscal policy has been introduced in an ad
hoc fashion ignoring the consequences of treating the government too as an
intertemporal optimiser. Suppose that the government is benevolent and chooses a
utility function which reflects that of a representative consumer. An immediate
problem is that there is no representative consumer in our overlapping generations
8 We are grateful to Ila Patnaik for assistance in collecting this data.
22model, but rather a spectrum of young and old consumers and those yet to be born.
If we base our social welfare function on aggregate consumption, a natural choice
based on (2.1) would be
(4.1)
at time t. (Note that and in (4.1) are actual values and not in per GDP
form).
By using a social welfare function which aggregates consumption across all
households of different ages we can formulate the optimisation problem in a linear-
quadratic form and so utilise the equilibrium concepts developed in Currie and
Levine (1993) and sketched out in Appendix B. However a consequence of using
this welfare criterion is that it embodies the policymaker’s desired distribution across
23present and future generations and is dependent upon the authorities’ discount factor.
Welfare-improvement with respect to our chosen social welfare function is not
necessarily Pareto-improving with respect to present and future generations; for
example, an increase in long-run growth can be at the expense of the current
generation (See Saint-Paul (1992)). In our model with private capital externalities
and tax distortions, there are potential efficiency gains, but these cannot be
disentangled from an increase in social welfare measured by (4.1) which arises from
redistribution between generations. Bearing in mind the distinction between welfare
improvement using (4.1) as the criterion, and Pareto improvement across all
generations, we formulate the governments problem as the maximisation of (4.1)
with respect to fiscal instruments given the model summarised in table 1.
Solvency Considerations.
Let rt=Rt-Nt be the ’growth-adjusted’ real interest rate over [t,t+1] and let
be the ’primary deficit’. Then solving (vi) in table 1 forward in time we
transform the budget identity into a solvency constraint at time t
(4.2)
provided that the tranversality or ’no-Ponzi’ condition
(4.3)
holds. In (4.2) and (4.3) we assume that eventually rt > 0. This is a feature of the
Yaari-Blanchard consumption/savings model and rules out ’dynamic inefficiency’.
According to (4.2) a government in debt with >0 must, sometime in the future,
run primary surpluses to be solvent.
24It should be noted that the transversality condition (4.3) does not require a
stable debt/GDP ratio but merely that, in the long run, it does not increase faster
than the growth adjusted real interest rate rt. Stability of is sufficient but not
necessary to ensure solvency. However in a world with even very small departures
from perfectly functioning capital markets, the notion of unbounded government
debt/GDP ratios does not appeal. A stronger concept of solvency is that debt/GDP
ratios do stabilise. We shall refer to the transversality condition (4.3) and the latter
stability condition as weak and strong solvency conditions respectively.
9 In this
paper we adopt the strong condition.
Expectations and Time Inconsistency
The credibility of policies and the associated problem of time inconsistency
is potentially a major issue in any policy debate. In the model of this paper time
inconsistency originates from three sources. First, it arises in our Yaari-Blanchard
model of intertemporal optimal choice of consumption, savings and demand for
money by each household where taxes are distortionary. Then when taxes are
distortionary the consequences for time inconsistency are well-known (see, for
example, Lucas and Stokey (1983), Stokey (1989) and Kydland and Prescott
(1980)). The second source of time inconsistency lies in the private capital
externality which can be corrected by public investment and the manipulation of
forward-looking savings decisions using the tax instrument.
Given these features of the model and rational expectations we can
distinguish between the cases when an authority has or does not have a reputation
for precommitment. A fiscal or monetary authority which enjoys reputation in this
9 Buiter and Patel (1990) provide an interesting discussion of this distinction.
25sense can exercise the greatest leverage over the private sector in that an announced
path of instrument settings would be credible and would effect private sector
behaviour immediately in the desired way. For instance the announcement of a low
taxes in the distant future will immediately raise savings, lower the real interest rate
and increase private investment.
When a government cannot precommit itself to a future policy, it must act
each period to maximise its welfare function, given that a similar optimisation
problem will be carried out in the next period. Formally, the policymaker maximises
at time t a welfare function Ut (or Et(Ut) in a stochastic setting) such that
(4.4)
where is the single-period welfare given in (4.1) and Ut is
evaluated on the assumption that an identical optimisation exercise is carried out
from time t+1 onwards. Optimisation is subject to the constraint of the model and
the strong solvency condition. The solution to this problem is found by dynamic
programming and, unlike precommitment policy leads to a time consistent trajectory
or rule for instruments. More details of both the precommitment and time-consistent
solution procedures are to be found in Appendix B.
Simulation Results.
How relevant are reputational (time inconsistent) regimes? A large literature
now exists on how a time inconsistent policy may be enforced despite the incentive
to renege. Mechanisms suggested include constitutional constraints (Kydland and
Prescott (1977)), trigger-strategy punishment mechanisms on the part of the private
sector (Barro and Gordon (1983), Currie and Levine (1993) and intricate asset-
management schemes for government debt (Lucas and Stokey (1983), Persson,
26Persson and Svensson (1987)). However these mechanisms for enforcing time-
inconsistent policies are not without their problems. The constitutional constraint
solution assumes away the problem . For trigger-strategy mechanisms there exists
the problem of how atomistic agents might coordinate on the precise punishment
scheme that supports a particular reputational equilibrium. Organized agents, in
some social contract, might achieve this co-ordination, but this still leaves a further
problem. There is a sense in which Friedman-type trigger strategies lack credibility
because carrying out the punishment is costly. Recent advances in game theory, in
particular the renegotiation-proofness literature, address this problem at an abstract




The simulations reported use a linearised form of the model and a Taylor series
quadratic approximation to the social welfare function valid in the vicinity of the
original steady-state corresponding to the calibration in table 2. Details are provided
in Appendix A. We consider the traditional time-inconsistency issue: the financing
of a given path of government spending by a combination of borrowing and
taxation. Thus both and are held fixed in this exercise and either the
taxation rate t or the debt/GDP ratio D can be considered as the fiscal instrument.
Table 3 reports the values for selected variables at times t=1 and t= for the policy
with precommitment (P) and the time-consistent policy (TC) where the P solution
10 al-Nowaihi and Levine (1994) discuss this literature and provide a resolution
for the Barro-Gordon monetary policy game. The application of their solution to
more general dynamic models, such as that presented in this paper, remains to be
tackled.
27cannot be enforced.
A number of features of these results are worthy of comment. First,
maximising utility (or, in our procedure, minimising a welfare loss) does not result
in long-run growth maximisation. The TC policy is sub-optimal but results in a
higher long-run growth rate. Second, the welfare loss under TC is only slightly
greater than under the P policy, but the means by which this is achieved is quite
different. Both policies involve a large increase in the taxation rate in the first few
periods which that wipe out government debt and turn the government into a
creditor that owns a part of the capital stock. This happens when the debt/GDP ratio,
in deviation form, falls below the baseline steady-state value D=53%. From figure
5, this occurs after about 3 years. Thereafter the two regimes radically depart. Under
TC the government continues to accumulate assets and finances its government
expenditure from the proceeds. In the long-run from table 2 it owns an equity stake
in private capital equal to 91-53=28% of GDP compared with a total capital/GDP
ratio of 1.87. There is now no longer an incentive to tax away the accumulated debt
- there isn’t any! -and the policy is time consistent.
11 By contrast, under the P
regime, the government eventually becomes a debtor again and finances its
expenditure in the conventional way. The policy is time-inconsistent because
everywhere along the trajectory at t>0 there exists an incentive to re-optimise with
a new burst of high taxation.
Variable P Regime TC Regime
11 Obstfeld (1991) obtains the same result in an exogenous growth model with











Table 3. The Precommitment (P) and Time-Consistent (TC) Financing Policies.
Notes: Variables are in % and measured as deviations about the original steady-
state. For example, nt=Nt-N where N is the original steady-state growth rate reported
in table 2 (i.e., N=4.5%). Values given are then for the two regimes.
5. Conclusions.
The results of the paper certainly suggest that for an approximately closed
economy such as India, fiscal policy matters and the choice of taxation rates, the
mix between infrastructure and total government expenditure and the level at which
the government debt/GDP ratio stabilises can all significantly affect the long-run
growth rate. Intertemporal aspects of policy are also important: the precommitment
regime which is initially optimal but time-inconsistent, and the non-precommitment
(time-consistent) regime lead to quite different outcomes in terms of the path for
29government debt; but the welfare differences are not great. Although sub-optimal in
terms of the intertemporal welfare function, the time-consistent regime actually leads
to a higher long-run growth rate. This is associated with long-run asset (rather than
debt) accumulation by the government which enables it to use the proceeds to
finance both spending and savings subsidies and avoid distortionary taxes.
Areas which will benefit from further research include, on the modelling side,
the development of an endogenous model of liquidity constraints and the introduc-
tion of adjustment costs into investment. An examination of growth and debt in the
context of an open economy (see Rebello (1992)) would enable fiscal policy to be
examined in more open export-oriented LDC’s and NIC’s. A deeper look at time
inconsistency, extending the analysis to expenditure as well as financing issues
30would merit further attention, as would as would an examination of government
myopia, originating from political instability.
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33APPENDIX A. The Linear-Quadratic Form of the Optimisation Problem.
Employing the rates of change approximation preceding (2.26), the
linearisation of the dynamic model set out in table 1 about the baseline steady-state










where etc and all variables are either ratios per GDP or rates of change.
To obtain a quadratic approximation to (4.1),
13 first note that Ct and Gt are
not expressed in per GDP form. With this in mind, write the government’s discount
factor as
and write the first summation in (4.1) at t=0 as
(A9)
Putting , the second term in (A9) can be written
(A10)
13 We are indebted to Joe Pearlman who worked out this approximation.
30Then using the approximation
(A11)
we obtain our required quadratic form:
+ a constant
(A12)
where the notation is used in this section only.
APPENDIX B. The Precommitment and Time-Consistent Regimes.
Replace the subscript t in (A1) with t+1 and take expectations at time t. Then
the model can be expressed in state-space form
(B1)
(B2)
where zt is an (n-m)×1 vector of predetermined variables at time t, xt is an m×1
vector of predetermined variables, st is an r×1 vector of target variables and
denotes rational expectations of xt+1. In our model there is only one non-predeter-
mined variable, ct, and m=1. Using (B2) we can write the policymaker’s welfare
loss at time t is given by where
(B3)
where is symmetric and positive definite and ke(0,1) is a discount factor. The
policymaker’s optimisation problem at time t=t is to minimise subject to the
model (B2) and the initial value of the predetermined vector . Substituting (B2)
31into(B3)givesthefollowingformofthe welfarelossusedinthesubsequent analysis.
(B4)
where , , and .
The Optimal Policy with Precommitment.
Consider the policymaker’s ex ante optimal policy at t=0 under the
assumption that precommitment is possible. By standard theory of Lagrangian
multipliers, we then minimise the Lagrangian
(B5)
with respect to {yt},{pt},and {wt} given z0. This gives the first order conditions
(B6)
(B7)
together with the original constraint
(B8)
all holding for t ³ 1. The condition
(B9)
completes the first order conditions. Equations (B6), (B7) and (B8) can be written
in state-space form
(B10)
The solution to (B10) requires 2n boundary conditions. The initial values z0
gives n-m of these conditions. The tranversality conditions
(B11)
provide n more conditions. The remaining m conditions are found from (B9). Since
z0 is given and x0 are ’free’, (B9) reduces to
(B12)
where is partitioned so that p1t is of dimension (n-m)x1.
Now seek a solution of the form
32(B13)
Substituting into (B7) we get
(B14)
say, where S is the solution to the Ricatti matrix equation
(B15)
To complete the solution we express the non-predetermined variables in
(A10), in terms of the predetermined variables . From (B14) we
obtain
(B16)
Substituting into (B14) gives
(B17)
say, and combining (B8), (B14) and (B16) gives
(B18)
say, where . Given the solution S to the Ricatti equation (B15),
equations (B16) to (B18) completely characterise the solution to the optimisation
problem.
The welfare loss along the trajectory of the optimal policy or ’cost to go’ can
now be evaluated. From the ’maximum principle’ and the first order condition (B9)
we have that
(B19)
Hence from (B13) on integration we have
33(B20)
at time t=0. At time t this becomes
(B21)
Another way of expressing, Wt which will prove useful, is found by eliminating xt
in (B21) using (B16). We obtain
(B22)
where which, using (B12), becomes at t=0.
The Optimal Rule with Precommitment.
The feedback form of the optimal policy with precommitment (at time t=0)
is given by (B17). Write in (B18) and partition so
that H11 is mxm.
Similarly partition in (B17) conformably with . Then from (B18) we
have
(B23)
Solving (B23) with (see (B12)) gives
(B24)
Hence the feedback form of the rule, can be expressed solely in
terms of the observable (at time t) predetermined variables zt.
The Time-Consistent (Markov-Perfect) equilibrium.
The precommitment solution takes the feedback form of a rule (B17) which,
as we have seen from (B23) is a rule with memory. The time-inconsistency of this
34equilibrium can be best seen by examining the ’cost-to-go’ (B21) . Re-optimisation
at time t and reneging on the commitment given at time 0 then involves putting
. Thus the gains from reneging are . Since it can be shown
that (i.e., negative definite)
14 it follows that everywhere along the optimal
trajectory at which , there will be gains from reneging and the ex ante optimal
policy is sub-optimal ex post.
In order to construct a time-consistent policy we employ dynamic program-
ming and seek a Markov-perfect equilibrium in which instruments are still allowed
to depend on past history , but only through a feedback on the current value of the
state variables. This precludes a feedback as in (B23) which involves memory. Thus
we seek a stationary solution in which Wt is minimised at time t subject
to the model (B2) in the knowledge that an identical procedure will be used to
minimise Wt+1 at time t+1. Other features of the solution are that , which
we know is true of saddlepath stable solutions to rational expectations models under
a rule , and . Notice that all these solution features follow from
the precommitment solution with p2t=0 for all t.
The solution is completely characterised by the matrices F, N and S. We now
derive an iterative procedure and sequences {Ft}, {Nt} and {St} which (if




partitioning and conformably with . Thus







Then putting and substituting for xt from (B28) we obtain
(B30)
where , and
. In (B30) Q and U are partitioned conformably with
as for A and B in (B26). Similarly eliminate xt from (B1) to obtain
(B31)
where and . Hence substituting (B31) into (B30) we
arrive at
(B32)
The control problem is now to minimise Wt with respect to wt given the current
state zt and given St+1 and Nt+1, which are determined by subsequent reoptimisa-
tions. The first order condition is then
(B33)
say. Then combining (B27) and (B33) we have
(B34)
say. Substituting (B33) into (B32) and equating the quadratic terms in zt gives
(B35)
Given St+1 and Nt+1, equations (B33), (B34) and (B35) give Ft,,Nt and St defining
36our iterative process. If these converge
15 to stationary values F, N and S, then we
have a time-consistent optimal rule wt=Gzt with cost to go
(B36)
15 I have not found any problems with convergence for a wide range of models,
including that in this paper.
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